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The Government-Linked Companies Transformation (GLCT) Programme began in 
2004, aims to transform Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) into high-
performing entities and helps accelerate the country’s social and economic 
development. In order to ensure the successfulness of this initiative, the roles of top 
management (CEO and Chairman) of the GLCs are essentials. Thus, this study is 
carried out to investigate whether the top management roles and attributes enhance the 
performance of GLCs and non-GLCs in Malaysia. Corporate governance variables 
(board size and board independence) and CEO/Chairman attributes (education level, 
professional qualification, age, gender, background as government servant or 
politician, insider or outsider of the firm and multiple directorships) are hypothesized 
to have relationship with GLCs and non-GLCs performance. The study covered a 
period of 2005-2009 for 54 GLCs and matched-pair 54 Non-GLCS listed on Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia. The regression results show there is no difference between 
the role of CEO or Chairman and firm performance (both Tobin’s Q and ROA) for 
both GLCs and NGLCs. It is also evidenced that board size does not have relationship 
with firm performance. However, board independence has negative association with 
firm’s ROA. CEO attributes (professional qualification, age and inside appointment) 
are having negative relationship with GLCs performance. Nevertheless, no 
relationship is found for similar Chairman’s attributes.  Further, Chairman of GLCs 
with political background/ government servant is negatively related to firm 
performance. Overall, it is suggested the appointment of CEOs of GLCs are critical 
and more sensitive towards firm performance as compared to the Chairman. Further 
research on the qualitative aspects of the CEO/Chairman attributes potentially will 
provide further insights about the reasons behind of the findings. 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Disclaimer                i 
Acknowledgement             ii 
Abstract             iii 
Table of Contents            iv 
Introduction              1 
 Research Background            1 
 Motivation of The Study           3 
 Objectives of The Research           5 
 Research Questions            5 
Literature Review             7 
 Government-Linked Companies          7 
 Board Size           11 
 Board Independence          13 
 CEO and Chairman Attributes        14 
  Education Level         15 
  Professional Qualification        17 
  Age           20 
  Gender          21 
  Politician or Government Servant       25 
  Inside or Outside Leader        27 
  Multiple Directorships        30 
Research Methodology          32 
 Sample Size           32 
 Data Gathering          32 
 Research Model and Measurement                                                                  32 
 Model Specification                                                                                         33 
Results and Discussion           35 
 Profile of Companies          33 
 Univariate Analysis                                                                    37 
 Multivariate Analysis          41 
Conclusion            47 
References            49 
Abstract 
The Government-Linked Companies Transformation (GLCT) Programme began in 2004, 
aims to transform Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) into high-performing entities and 
helps accelerate the country’s social and economic development. In order to ensure the 
successfulness of this initiative, the roles of top management (CEO and Chairman) of the 
GLCs are essentials. Thus, this study is carried out to investigate whether the top 
management roles and attributes enhance the performance of GLCs and non-GLCs in 
Malaysia. Corporate governance variables (board size and board independence) and 
CEO/Chairman attributes (education level, professional qualification, age, gender, 
background as government servant or politician, insider or outsider of the firm and multiple 
directorships) are hypothesized to have relationship with GLCs and non-GLCs performance. 
The study covered a period of 2005-2009 for 54 GLCs and matched-pair 54 Non-GLCS listed 
on Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. The regression results show there is no difference between 
the role of CEO or Chairman and firm performance (both Tobin’s Q and ROA) for both 
GLCs and NGLCS. It is also evidenced that board size does not have relationship with firm 
performance. However, board independence has negative association with firm’s ROA. CEO 
attributes (professional qualification, age and inside appointment) are having negative 
relationship with GLCs performance. Nevertheless, no relationship is found for similar 
Chairman’s attributes.  Further, Chairman of GLCs with political background/ government 
servant is negatively related to firm performance. Overall, it is suggested the appointment of 
CEOs of GLCs are critical and more sensitive towards firm performance as compared to the 
Chairman. Further research on the qualitative aspects of the CEO/Chairman attributes 







Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) have grown and evolved significantly since their 
humble beginnings post Malaysia’s independence in 1957. Today, GLCs form an integral part 
of the Malaysian economy as they provide mission-critical services, catalyse developments in 
strategic sectors and at the start of the Government-Linked Transformation (GLCT) Program, 
employ around 5% of the national workforce and constitute 36% of total market capitalisation 
at Bursa Malaysia. 
 
Prior to 2004, GLCs underperformed the broader Malaysian market, both financially and 
operationally – a trend that risked derailing the country’s efforts to become a high income 
nation by 2020. Therefore, the transformation of GLCs was imperative in order to catalyse 
Malaysia towards the developed nation status. 
 
In order to improve GLC performance, in 2004 the then Prime Minister, Dato’ Seri Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi announced that the transformation of the GLCs would be made a national 
priority, which led to the introduction of the GLCT Programme. The Programme aims to 
transform GLCs into high performing entities and help accelerate the country’s social and 
economic development. When Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abdul Razak took office in 
2009, he announced that the Government was committed to ensure that the transformation of 
the GLCs continues, if anything, with greater urgency and focus. He also said GLCs must 
aspire to greater heights, whether in being best in their class or emerging as future regional if 
not global champions. 
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The GLCT Programme has 3 Underlying Principles, 5 Policy Thrusts and 10 Initiatives. 
These were developed and documented in the Transformation Manual, launched on 29 July 
2005. To support the 5 Policy Thrusts, 10 Initiatives were developed and launched for 
implementation at GLICs and GLCs. The 10 GLCT Initiatives had been identified on the 
basis of their importance as levers for change, potential impact on value, and the ability of 
Putrajaya Committee Group to drive change in these areas. 
 
 
The Transformation Manual is the output of this endeavour and is intended to be a living 
document – with new Policy Guidelines and Initiatives to be added over time, and updates or 
amendments to be made to existing Guidelines and Initiatives as necessary. The Policy 
Guidelines will take effect on 29
th 
July, 2005, and amendments and updates shall periodically 
be made available online. Ten initiatives have been identified covering key areas of GLC 
operations and governance including, inter alia, Board Effectiveness, the Monitoring and 
Management Capabilities of Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs), Director 
Capabilities, Regulatory Environment, Procurement, Capital Management, Leadership and 
Human Capital Development, Performance Management and Operational Improvements.  
 
These ten initiatives, known as the 2005/06 initiatives will be gradually rolled-out and 
implemented in 2005 and 2006. Work has commenced on all ten initiatives including the 
launch of several pilot projects. In the case of the Performance Management module, this 
builds on the 2004 measures of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Performance-Linked 
Compensation (PLC). It is expected that GLICs and GLC Boards and senior management 
should adopt these Initiatives and Guidelines and complete their implementation within their 




MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
The Government-Linked Companies Transformation (GLCT) Programme began in 2004, 
aims to transform Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) into high-performing entities and 
to create several regional champions by 2015. The GLCT Programme serves as a pre-cursor 
to the critical National Transformation Programme (NTP) and the overall national ambition is 
to transform Malaysia into a high income nation that is inclusive and sustainable. 
 
The objective of the Transformation Manual is to transform Government-Linked Companies 
(GLCs) into high-performing entities is critical for the future prosperity of Malaysia. To 
facilitate this transformation, the Putrajaya Committee for GLC High Performance (PCG) has 
undertaken two sets of actions. First, the codification of Policy Guidelines with the objective 
of providing an enabling environment for GLCs to perform. Second, the translation of the 
Policy Guidelines into specific Initiatives that are targeted to drive and enhance GLC 
performance.  
 
However, on May 14, 2010, Malaysian were shocked with the first high-profile removal of 
the head of a government-linked company was reported in all Malaysian press. The Sime 
Darby Bhd’s group Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Datuk Ahmad Zubir Murshid was asked 
to take a leave of absence before the expiry of his contract on 26 November 2010. The Sime 
Darby Chairman, Tun Musa Hitam comments that Zubir’s leaving was in connection with the 
cost overruns that the group’s energy and utilities division had suffered in carrying out 
projects in Qatar and the Bakun hydro-electric dam. Related to projects delay and cost 
overruns in Qatar and Bakun, the board of directors announced a negative impact of RM964 
million on the group’s second half results for the year ended June 30, 2010 (The Star, 14 
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May). The share price of Sime Darby was traded at RM8.65 on 12 May and the price dropped 
by 51 cents to RM8.14 and became the top loser counter on 14 May trading day. 
 
Following Ahmad Zubir resignation, Datuk Azhar Abdul Hamid who is currently the head of 
Sime Darby Plantation division was appointed as the acting group CEO. Two months later, 
Datuk Mohd Bakke Salleh, a former of Felda Global Ventures Holdings Sdn Bhd’s group 
President and CEO stepped in as Sime Darby’s acting president and group CEO. The former 
acting group CEO, Datuk Azhar was redesignated as the special adviser to the acting 
President and group CEO (The Star, 16 July). However, Datuk Azhar decided to quit from the 
group with a reason to enable Bakke to restructure the group. The termination of Sime Darby 
former CEO and the selection of new CEO from outsider have become a debate among 
analyst and individuals. For example, Alsetdek Al Haj, a Senior Manager of TA Investment 
Group and Senator Musa Sheikh Fadzir argued that it is unfair the blame the CEO alone for 
the Sime Darby’s loses. He added that the whole board should be responsible for the massive 
fall of Sime Darby income and to exhibit their responsibility, all board members need to quit 
from the group. Further to that, the Ministry of Finance should consider hiring another board 
to replace the existing Sime Darby’s board members that are more expert, capable and 
experience in managing a huge conglomerate company. 
 
Based on Sime Darby scenario, it can be concluded that the former group chief executive 
officer was asked to make his post vacant due to performance problem and his place was 
filled in by an outside successor. The resignation of the former group chief executive also has 
significant impact on group’s future performance as the share price of the group dropped 
significantly after his termination. Later, the selection of new CEO from outside has improve 
firm performance as the share price of Sime Darby increase to the same level as before the 
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crisis, six months after the appointment of Datuk Ahmad Bakre. Referring to Sime Darby 
case, it seems that top management of a company do have significant influence on firm 
performance. Since this conclusion is derived from one company, thus, it is interesting to 
study whether top management characteristics have some impact on firm performance. 
Therefore, the main objective of this study is to examine the top management characteristics 
of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs), and in comparison with Non-Government Linked 
Companies (NGLCs), to examine whether GLCs have higher firm value or vice versa. 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
This study embarks on the following objectives: 
1. To identify whether the GLCs or NGLCs that have higher performance. 
2. To identify whether CEO or Chairman role that enhance the GLCs and NGLCs 
performance. 
3. To examine top management (CEO and Chairman) attributes that lead to higher GLCs 
and NGLCs performance. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Main research question: 
1. Do top management (CEO and Chairman) roles and attributes enhance the 
performance of GLCs and non-GLCs in Malaysia?  
 
Guiding research questions: 
• Which type of company has higher firm performance; GLCs or NGLCs? 




































GLCs are controlled by the Malaysian government via the Federal Government-Linked 
Investment Companies (GLICs). GLICs are investment arms of the government that allocate 
government funds the GLCs. In addition to having ownership in GLCs, the Malaysian 
government also has an influence in the appointment of members of the board of directors and 
senior management positions. The government also has a controlling stake in making major 
decisions – for example contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisition and 
divestments. To-date, there is a paucity of empirical research on the extent to which 
Malaysian GLCs create value. The effects of government intervention on companies’ 
performance have been empirically assessed in prior studies primarily by comparing 
performance of companies with versus without government intervention. Research findings 
suggest that there are two competing schools of thoughts (www.khazanah.com.my, Sec. IV, 
revised 29/7/05).  
 
According to the first school of thought, companies with government intervention are better 
governed (Caves & Christensen, 1980; Kay & Thompson, 1986; Martin & Parker, 1995; Kole 
& Mulherin, 1997; Ramirez & Tan, 2004; Ang & Ding, 2006). More specifically, these 
companies are not only under the watchful eyes of the public, namely investors and 
shareholders, but also the government. As a consequence, management of these companies is 




In contrast, the second school of thought is of the opinion that companies in private hands are 
more competitive and have more incentive to innovate and contain costs (Boycko, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1996; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Shleifer, 1998; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Sun & 
Tong, 2002; Wei & Varela, 2003). This is because their counterparts with government 
intervention are not only concerned about ensuring that the goal of wealth maximization is 
met. These companies with government intervention also need to give due consideration to 
several social goals that contribute towards nation building; the importance of wealth 
maximization is downplayed due to the division of attention across several goals.  
 
In the context of Malaysian situation, GLCs Transformation Manual reported that most of the 
GLCs underperformed in terms of operations and financial indicators since 1990. A study 
done by CIMB (June, 2004) also found that the Malaysian GLCs are less productive users of 
capital, more geared and have lagged significantly in terms of total shareholder’s return. 
These results shocked the nations since the GLCs constitute a significant part of the 
Malaysian economic structure. The media has repeatedly reported that most of the GLCs 
incurred a huge sum of losses and have involved in activities or project that are not related to 
their core business. This has resulted to the poor performing portfolios of business among 
several GLCs. 
 
As such the GLCs Transformation Program which was initiated in May 2004 was launched on 
29 July 2005. The Program includes various strategies aimed at enhancing corporate 
governance, developing social leaders and clarifying social obligations to steer the GLCs, 
particularly in upgrading the effectiveness of GLCs Board. The government expects GLCs to 
increase their investments and spending to make up for the shortfall arising from the 
government’s move to cut its own expenditure and reduce the budget deficit. Hence, in 
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achieving the objectives of enhancing the firm value and reducing the business expenditures, 
the role of company’s top management become crucial. Alas, this study hypothesized that: 
H1: There is a different between GLCs and NGLCs performance. 
 
In attaining the objectives of the GLC Transformation programmes, the role of the top 
management become a critical aspect to be considered. So far, there is no general agreement 
on the specific definition of top management of the companies. Some refer top management 
as the board of directors, while others define executives who are responsible for running the 
company’s day to day operations as the top management of the company. For example, Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995) classify the president of the company as the top management, while 
Renneboog (2000) refers the board of directors as the company’s top management. Further, 
Conyon and Florou (2002) and Wallace and Zinkin (2005) define top management as the 
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Group Managing Directors. Recently, Maury 
(2006) defines the CEO as the top management of a company. 
 
Despite the various definitions given on who is the top management of a company, Wallace 
and Zinkin (2005) state that there are three roles that must be successfully undertaken if a 
company wants to have good corporate governance practices. First is the role of the Chairman 
who is responsible for presenting the board to the shareholders. The Chairman has three 
distinct roles to play: (1) ensuring that board is effective; (2) communicating properly with the 
shareholders; and (3) ensuring that the relationship between board and the CEO works to the 
advantage of all parties concerned.  
 
Second is the role of the CEO who reports to the board of directors at each board meeting and 
advises on issues that reflect the organization policies including: (1) all matters that materially 
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affect the company and its performance, including any potential strategic or political 
significant development prospect; (2) any under-performing businesses/activities of the 
company and any proposal to rectify the situation; and (3) all material matters that affect or 
could affect shareholders and the markets in which the shareholder’s interest are traded. 
 
Finally is the role of the board which is collectively responsible for the success and failure of 
a company. The main function of the board is to act as the representative of the shareholders 
and the central body for decision making in a company. Apart from that, the board is believed 
to play an important role in monitoring CEO.   
 
By referring to the discussion on the role of top management, it seems that these three parties 
have a significant influence in enhancing firm performance. Therefore, larger shareholders in 
a company, for example, the Ministry of Finance as the largest shareholders of GLCs, has a 
power to appoint the right candidate to be one of the directors in that particular company, 
determine their remuneration packages and career advancement without the rigidity of the 
procedures utilized by the civil service (Anwar & Sam, 2006). 
 
Similar to other companies, GLCs are also managed by board of directors that are appointed 
by Ministry of Finance. The aims of the boards are to maximize managerial control, to 
minimize agency costs, to maximize and protect economic value of the firm, as the 
representatives of various stakeholders and as an instrument of control between stakeholders, 
board and organization.  
 
In Malaysia, in order to strengthen the role of the board as a check and balance entity on the 
owner-manager relationship, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
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suggests that at least two of board members or one third of board members is independent. In 
addition, companies also should have clear division between Chief Executives Officer’s 
(CEO) and Chairman’s role (KLSE, 1999). Furthermore, all directors have to complete the 
mandatory accreditation program which educates Malaysian directors on their roles and 
responsibilities. In conjunction to fulfill that requirement, the board also needs to disclose its 
best practices with regards to the nomination of director, preferably with services contract to 
reflect the required mix of skills, knowledge, experiences and other qualities which can add 
value to and guide the company. Based on the above arguments, this study hypothesized that: 
 H1a: There is a difference in CEO/Chairman role of GLCs and NGLCs. 
 
Board Size 
Board size refers to the number of directors who serves on the board (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
There are conflicting views on the appropriate size of the board of directors. Shivdasani and 
Yermark (1999) reports that the appropriate size of a board is 11 persons while, Vafeas (1999) 
documents a size of 12. The size of a board may be increased due to the increase in 
shareholders activism, consolidation in banking industries and increase in firm size (Zulkifli, 
Abdul Samad & Ismail, 2003). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that large boards are more 
superior to the small ones because big groups have more capabilities and resources to solve 
group tasks (Jensen, 1993). Larger firms are likely to benefit from having a larger board of 
directors because they have more external contracting relationship. Similarly, the governance 
of a firm would be more difficult when it diversifies its operation and requires more outsiders 
to provide specific information. In addition, this kind of firm may also require more outsiders 
on the board since broader skills would be required to adequately monitor the firm’s multiple 




Further, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) explain that large groups can enhance problem-
solving capabilities by increasing the amount of information that can be absorbed and 
recalled. Besides, larger boards will increase the number of potential strategies and critical 
judgment to correct errors in inference and analysis. In addition, it will also increase the range 
of perspectives brought to bear on problems. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue that bigger 
boards may be helpful for some companies as they provide diversity that would help 
companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainties.  
 
Despite the advantages, there are also some disadvantages of large boards in relation to 
coordination and communication problems that small boards do not have. As there are fewer 
members, small boards tend to be more cohesive and tend to make decisions and reach 
consensus faster than large boards. Jensen (1993) claims that large boards size make them less 
effective at monitoring management due to free-riding problem amongst directors and 
increased decision making time. Thus, he suggests that an appropriate board’s size is a board 
that consists of eight directors or less. Findings by Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009) support the 
argument made by Jensen (1993).  They find that board size has a negative relationship with 
Tobin’s Q which indicates that larger board size reduces firm performance. They adds that 
Tobin’s Q increases until the board size reaches a maximum of five directors and declines 
when the boards have six members and stable until board size is twelve. Further, theye claims 
that Tobin’s Q decreases significantly as the board consists of more than twelve members. 
 
In Malaysia, the average of firms’ board size is between seven to eight members (Shakir, 
2009; Wan-Abdullah, Ismail & Jamaluddin, 2008; Wan-Hussin, 2009). These findings are 
similar to a survey conducted by KLSE/PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999). They reports that the 
average size of the boards of Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs) is eight, of which 
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three members are non-executive directors, while five are executive directors. In order to 
increase the board effectiveness, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (2005) suggests 
that the boards should consist of ten members comprising four independent directors, the 
managing director and five executive directors, including executive chairman and two 
executive directors who are employees of the firm. Thus, we hypothesized that: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board size and performance. 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between board size of GLCs and performance.  
H2b: There is a positive relationship between board size of NGLCs and performance  
 
Board Independence 
Board composition is referred to as the director type that is widely recognized as a dichotomy 
between inside and outside directors (i.e executives and non-executive directors). 
Outsiders/non-executive directors are not members of the CEO team, their associates, or 
families. They are also not employees of the firm or its subsidiaries and are not members of 
the immediately previous CEO group (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The proportion of the outside 
directors can be measured in terms of the ratio of outside directors to board size. The presence 
of an outsider into on a board is related to board independence (The Investor Relation Source, 
March 28, 2003). 
 
The Bosch Report in 1991 (cited from Suchard, Singh & Barr, 2001) defines independent 
directors as the directors not being a substantial stockholder, not being an ex-employee, not 
being retained as a professional advisor (either individually or through his/her firm) to the 
firm, not being a significant supplier or customer to the firm and overall having no significant 
contractual relationship with the firm. In the Malaysian context, the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
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Requirement (2002) Paragraph 15(2) requires that at least two of the board members or one 
third of the board members, whichever is higher, comprise of independent directors.  
 
According to agency theory, an effective board should comprise of outside directors and these 
non-management directors are believed to provide better monitoring to the firm as a result due 
to their independence (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A balanced board reduces the potential 
conflicts of interest among decision makers and residual risk bearers. It also reduces the 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. Renneboog (2000) 
discusses several reasons why outsiders may act as a control task. Firstly, outsiders are legally 
bound to monitor firm performance due to their fiduciary duty. Moreover, in an equity market 
with a strong ownership concentration, many outside directors are appointed to represent the 
large shareholders. Consequently, outsiders have the incentives to develop a reputation as 
decision control experts. Based on the above literatures, we hypothesized that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between percentage of independent directors and 
performance. 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between percentage of independent directors of 
GLCs and performance.  
H3b: There is a positive relationship between percentage of independent directors of 
NGLCs and performance. 
 
CEO and Chairman Attributes 
The Chairman of the company is the leader of the board and has responsibility to ensure that 
board is effective, communicate with the shareholders and ensure that the relationship 
between board and the CEO works to the advantage of all parties concerned. Meanwhile, the 
CEO of a company is a person that plays a major role in managing and ensuring that the 
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business performance. However, it is a tough challenge given to the Chairman and CEO. To 
be a Chairman or CEO, an individual needs to possess certain criteria and qualities.  
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that executives’ characteristics should be used to 
influence management selection and development. Similarly, Datta and Guthrie (1994) 
suggest that human resources executives should be more involved in CEO selection to make 
sure issues of ‘‘fit’’ between the individual and position are considered sufficiently. Study 
conducted by Manner (2010) found that a company wants to appoint a CEO who has a greater 
breadth of functional career experience, particularly in functional areas that focus extensively 
on stakeholder groups. The next section will discuss on the attributes of Chairman and CEO. 
The attributes consider in this study is the Chairman and CEO is holding multiple 
directorship, serve as politician or government servant, insider or outsider, professional 
qualification, educational level, age, and gender. 
 
Education Level  
Moving towards emerging and competitive market, the career background of CEO has shifted 
from a production man to a professional CEO with a higher educational background. A higher 
educational background such as the post-graduate level will increase the value of individual’s 
human capital (Phan & Hoon, 1995). Bantel and Jackson (1989) claim that CEOs with higher 
educational backgrounds are considered as  having a higher cognitive ability, higher capacity 
for decision processing, higher tolerance for ambiguity and propensity or receptivity to 
innovation which equip them with an effective solution for a complex decision making task. 
Thus, CEOs with high education qualification are regarded as valuable human capital to the 
company. As a result, CEOs with high education qualification are less likely to experience 
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turnover as their turnover portray a loss to a company (Thomas, Litchert & Ramaswamy, 
1991; Ou-Yan & Shuang-Shii, 2007).  
 
CEO is often cited as the key player that influences a firm’s overall strategies since who the 
top manager is and what strategies he or she pursues are expected to make a difference. For 
example, Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) found that CEOs influence sales, profits and profit 
margin by 5-15 percent of the explained variance. A similar finding offered by Hitt, Ireland 
and Stadler (1982) when they find that performance variables such as sales return on equity, 
price earnings ratio and earnings per share are influenced differently according to the CEO’s 
functional area of specialization. 
 
Functional background is regarded as an important indicator of the types of knowledge and 
cognitive biases that the CEO bring to their jobs. Functional background has been shown to 
directly influence how problems are defined, information is processed and strategic choices 
are made (Rajagoplan & Datta, 1996). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) claim that different 
industries will value functional background differently depending on the critical contingencies 
in their environment pose. In addition, there has been a shift in CEO’s career background over 
time. The old-style managers who have backgrounds in production and/or sales spend most of 
their career in the same company. Meanwhile, today’s professional managers are more likely 
to move between firms as and when their expertise is required by all firms (Hayes & 
Abernathy, 1980).  
 
Zajac and Stearns (1997) suggest that CEOs with finance and legal functional backgrounds as 
professional or expert. They list two reasons why CEOs with finance and legal backgrounds 
are considered as professionals or experts. First, their knowledge base requires a professional 
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type of education and secondly, at the same time their skill is more highly specialized in terms 
of what they had learned.  
 
Based on the above arguments, researchers expected that the education level of the CEOs to 
play a vital role in the boosting the economy of companies. GLCs need CEOs that are well 
educated, knowledgeable and well-equipped with current business situations. Then only the 
business operations can sustain in this competitive business atmosphere. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H4a: There is a positive relationship between CEO educational background and 
performance, for GLCs. 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between CEO educational background and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
H4c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman educational background and 
performance, for GLCs. 
H4d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman educational background and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
 
Professional Qualification 
A director is an expert if he/she has a great skill or knowledge in a particular subject/area 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2009). The revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(2007) stresses that nominating committees should consider recruiting directors that have 
skills, experience and qualifications. Research also notes that expertise may affect the firm’s 
performance. Companies should look for superior quality directors to monitor management 
(Fairchild & Li, 2005). Consulting skills is a combination of diagnostic and behavioural skills 
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that enable professionals to collaborate with line managers to develop solutions for business 
performance problems (Green, 2008).  
 
As a professional, it is necessary to be competence and master the knowledge and apply it to 
specific business settings (Brockbank, Ulrich & Beatty, 1999). Lawler and Mohrman (2003) 
argued that professionals need to become more effective strategic business partners. By 
having these characters, thus indirectly these professionals could positively influence the 
value of the company.  
 
Kesner (1988) found that most directors’ occupations are business executives, followed by 
lawyers, consultants, and school professors. Directors’ expertise such as in accounting, 
financing, consulting and law supports managers in making decisions. Therefore, directors’ 
expertise can have a certain effect on firm value (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). 
Erickson, Park, Reising & Shin (2005) evidenced that bank directors with financial and 
accounting knowledge monitor managers more effectively. Therefore, bank directors increase 
firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
A number of studies suggest that those directors who sit on several corporate boards have 
developed reputation capital as experts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Experts that are outsiders are 
more effective in monitoring the board and firm performance (Useem, 1993). Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson (1999) contend that directors whose is derived from a professional or 
business relationship may be highly effective at the resource dependence and 
counseling/expertise board roles due to their industry contacts, business acumen, specialized 
knowledge and skills. They are appointed as board members so that the firm can tap into the 
resources that they bring. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003) posit those directors that have 
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skills in knowledge-based fields such as law; finance, accounting and consulting, and they are 
sought after their value-adding advice and counsel. 
 
Following the recent wave of accounting scandals, regulators have stressed the need for more 
financial experts on boards. For example, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) found that having 
directors with a CPA, CFA or similar degree on audit committees translates into fewer 
earnings restatements. Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) document a positive stock market 
reaction to the appointment of directors with accounting knowledge to the audit committees 
(though not to the appointment of other financial experts). Guner, Malmendler and Tate 
(2008) claims that finance experts significantly affect the finance and investment policies of 
the firms on whose board they serve. However, the impact of financial experts on shareholder 
value is difficult to assess and it does not seem to improve when financial experts join the 
board of directors. 
 
At the same time, firms are facing a challenge in searching for qualified and competent 
directors to sit on the boards (Hendry, 2002; Hartvigsen, 2007). A survey conducted in 
America by Ernst & Young found that many firms in Europe and America complain that they 
struggle to find experts to be board members. TIAA-CREF and other pension funds in the US 
required companies to create boards that are “composed of qualified individuals who reflect 
the diversity of experience” (Forbes, 1995). Thus, many boards in the US have appointed 
directors with experience from other firms and industries (Westphal & Milton, 2000). 
 
Actually there is no shortage of qualified directors, however, stringent laws and rules 
pertaining to directorship and litigation by shareholders make directors more careful in 
accepting their job (Raber, 2005). Companies can no longer be satisfied with directors who 
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simply put in a token appearance. Companies seek qualified directors, together with their 
expertise (Berube, 2005). Furthermore, Michael Powers, leader of Hewitt’s executive 
compensation group, also claim “...there is a struggle-taking place between the growing need 
for qualified directors and the reluctance of directors to join the boards.” A report from 
Christian & Timbers in New York also reflects the tough competition when searching for 
qualified non-executive directors (Bates, 2003). Based on the above arguments, researchers 
posit that the professional qualification does give a positive impact on firm performance. 
Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between CEO professional qualification and 
performance, for GLCs. 
H5b: There is a positive relationship between CEO professional qualification and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
H5c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman professional qualification 
and performance, for GLCs. 
H5d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman professional qualification 
and performance, for NGLCs. 
 
Age  
Demographic characteristics such as age and tenure are commonly used to study the 
sensitivity of corporate performance. With regard to the age of directors, the Companies Act 
1965 prohibits the appointment of a person of or over the age of 70 years as a director of a 
public company or subsidiary of a public company. The office of a director shall become 
vacant until the forthcoming annual general meeting after he attains the age of 70 years. If the 
vacancy is not filled at the meeting, it may be filled as a casual vacancy. In addition, Kang 
(2002) claims that there is a provision in the company’s articles regarding the retirement by 
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rotation of directors so as to afford the shareholders of the company the opportunity to review 
the director’s performance. For listed companies, the election of directors is to take place 
every year; and for all directors including the managing directors, they need to retire at least 
once in every three years but they are eligible for re-election.  
 
Age can also be used as a proxy for CEO’s knowledge. It is commonly stated that young 
CEOs are less experienced; therefore they have lower information level about the internal and 
external environment of the firm. Brockmann and Simmonds (1997) argued that managerial 
success is positively correlated with age. It is argued that when the manager is older in age, 
thus the chances of firm’s managerial success is higher as compared to younger manager. 
This may also be due to the level of experience that the manager’s possess. Older executives 
also tend to be more risk averse than younger executives (Carlsson & Karlsson, 1970). Thus, 
CEO age is also an important element in determining the success of the company. Based on 
the arguments, it is hypothesize that: 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between CEO age and performance, for GLCs. 
H6b: There is a positive relationship between CEO age and performance, for NGLCs. 
H6c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman age and performance, for 
GLCs. 




Research has found that male-owned businesses outperform female-owned businesses. 
Loscocco, Robinson, Hall and Allen (1991) found that firms owned by men outperformed 
firms owned by women in terms of sales volumes and income. They suggested that women’s 
22 
 
lack of industry experience and their concentration on less profitable sectors of the economy 
contributed significantly to their lower sales and income. They also found that firm’s size 
generated more sales to male-controlled firms than female-controlled firms, and that females 
were not able to generate as much financial benefit from size as males. These findings were 
supported in a comparative study conducted by Fischer, Reuber and Dyke (1993), which 
found that firms owned by men consistently outperformed those of women with respect to 
number of employees, annual sales, and income. This research also found that men’s 
businesses exhibited a higher level of productivity than those of women in terms of sales per 
employee. Moreover, they found that women had less relative business experience than men, 
which they suggested is indicative of the barriers that women face with respect to access to 
business experience.  
 
Shim and Eestlick (1998) examined differences and similarities between Hispanic female and 
male business owners with respect to business characteristics, personal background, and 
financial performance. They found that Hispanic female business owners had fewer years of 
business experience, fewer employees, and smaller annual sales than their male counterparts. 
However, they argued that female-owned businesses were as likely to achieve higher growth 
stage as their male counterparts. These findings were supported by the findings of Fasci and 
Valdez (1998) who noted significant differences between male-owned firms and female 
owned firms with respect to the ratio of profit to gross revenue. They suggested that work 
experience and age of business contributed significantly to that difference. In their sample, 
women had less experience and their firms were younger than those of men, which they 





Shaw, Marlow, Lam and Carter (2009) conducted a study on gender and entrepreneurial 
capital with firm performance. Women business owners undercapitalise their firms, typically 
investing approximately only one third of the capital used by men. Therefore, the firm 
performance is lower. An empirical study by Alowaihan (2004) found that even though 
women are older than their male counterparts and have higher education levels, women-
owned firms financial performance was significantly lower than men-owned firms because 
the women have less business experience.  
 
Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) found that women’s firms were not more likely to fail, nor less 
successful than those headed by men. No doubt these findings contradicted the long held 
belief of women’s inferiority in entrepreneurship. Moreover, they suggested that processes 
underlying small business performance headed by men were similar to those headed by 
women. On the other hand, they found that firms headed by women were smaller and had a 
lower level of gross earnings than those headed by men. In addition, they found that men had 
more experience in terms of prior self-employment than women. Nevertheless, Kalleberg and 
Leicht (1991) argued that these factors had no bearing on the survivability and success of 
these firms.  
 
These findings were supported recently in a comparative study in Australia that found no 
significant differences between the financial performance of male-and female-controlled 
businesses in terms of total income to total assets, the return on assets, and the return on 
equity, although women-owned businesses were significantly smaller and generated less 
profit and income. Furthermore, after removal of the control variables, there was evidence to 
suggest that female-controlled businesses outperformed male-controlled businesses (Watson, 
2002). A study by Nielsen and Huse (2010) in Norway also claimed that it is difficult to 
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establish a direct relationship between board gender composition and firm performance. To 
the extent that boards perform multiple tasks simultaneously and women have a differential 
impact on some of the tasks, no overall performance differences can be detected between 
firms with high and low ratios of women directors. 
 
Empirical study evidences that there is a difference in the way male owners and female 
owners view and run their firms. There is a strong perception that society favours men over 
women (Prasso, 1996). Male owners tend to be more competitive, have larger networks and 
want to be the first. Female owners, on the other hand are more nurturing, supportive in the 
work environment and do not focus on the financial performance as an important element for 
firm survival, but focus more on the primary objectives of the firm. They tend to avoid risk 
and to focus more on a long term perspective (Butner & Moore, 1997). In Britain, the 
appointment of women to top boards is still rare and they remain a distinct minority (Holton, 
2000). 
 
Women are often thought to be disadvantaged relative to men in the business arena. It is 
commonly believed that female-owned businesses are less successful and fail more often than 
male-owned businesses (Cuba, Decenzo & Anish, 1983). Recent surveys carried out within 
the US found that there are more women on corporate boards than 20 years ago (Holton, 
2000), however, they still only represent between 5 and 11% of the appointments (Bilimoria 
& Wheeler, 2000; Burke, 2000). Eagly and Carli (2007) highlighted that women occupy more 
than 40% of all managerial positions in the US. Based on the most highly paid executives of 
Fortune 500, only 6% are women. Most notably, only 2% of the CEOs are women, and only 
15% of the seats on the board of directors are held by women. Ferrary (2009) carried a study 
in France. It is evidenced that there is an association between women and the effect on share 
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price. Feminization of management seems to be a protection against financial crisis. Based on 
the arguments, it is hypothesize that: 
H7a: There is a positive relationship between male CEO and performance, for GLCs. 
H7b: There is a positive relationship between male CEO and performance, for 
NGLCs. 
H7c: There is a positive relationship between male Chairman and performance, for 
GLCs. 




Politician or Government Servant  
The composition of senior government officer and politician can also affect the firm 
performance. As an appreciation to the government servants and politician for their service 
and loyalty, these parties may be selected as board members in GLCs. For companies the 
selection of senior government officer and politician can bring some benefit to the companies 
due to their wider network with government agency. Mohamad, Hassan, Nasir and Chen 
(2006) examine political connectedness in Malaysian firms, find that the preferential 
treatment received by politically connected firms. They also find that politically connected 
have an easy access to loan facilities and government contract. 
 
Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) claim that government intervention in companies lead to the 
hiring of a CEO/Chairman that has a connection with the government. They find that almost 
27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or 
current government bureaucrats. In addition, government-controlled firms are more likely to 
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appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant 
professional background. Due to low degrees of professionalism, firms run by politically 





Abdul Wahab, How and Verhoeven (2008) found that political connectedness has influences 
the interrelationships between corporate governance, institutional ownership and firm 
performance. Politically connectedness firms also have significantly poorer corporate 
governance but a significantly higher institutional ownership. This indicates that large 
institutional investors in Malaysia which are typically government-controlled channel their 
investments to politically connectedness firms. Further, firms with a Bumiputera-dominated 
board have significantly better firm performance, better corporate governance and higher 
institutional ownership. 
 
Johnson & Mitton (2003) found no difference between politically connectedness and 
unconnected firms in returns after September 1998. In terms of total assets, it was evidenced 
that politically connected firms were significantly larger (about twice the size on average) 
compared with unconnected firms, although asset growth immediately before the crisis was 
not significantly greater in connected firms. So, based on the literatures, we hypothesized that: 
 
H8a: There is a negative relationship between politician/government servant CEO 
                                                            
1
 Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) provide evidence that firms with politically connected CEOs were outperformed 
by those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post IPO stock returns. Those 
companies also have poorer three year- post IPO earnings growth, sales growth and change in return on assets. 
Their evidence is consistent with the “grabbing hand” argument (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) that 
bureaucrats/politicians extract resources from listed PLCs under their control to fulfil their objectives that are not 




and performance, for GLCs. 
H8b: There is a negative relationship between politician/government servant CEO 
and performance, for NGLCs. 
H8c: There is a negative relationship between politician/government servant 
Chairman and performance, for GLCs. 
H8d: There is a negative relationship between politician/government servant 
Chairman and performance, for NGLCs. 
 
Inside or Outside Leader  
Upon decision whether to select internal or external Chairman/ CEO, the Ministry of Finance 
has a tendency to select an insider to become GLCs Chairman/CEO. The reason is because 
insider selection highlights the importance of continuity. For example, Kotter (1982) argue 
that successful managers acquire expertise through long tenure with the company or 
companies in the same industry. He adds that insiders have advantage over the outsiders for 
two reasons. First, insiders are more knowledgeable than outsiders about firms’ specific 
products, competitors, markets, customers and employees. This knowledge will help 
managers understand a large, complex, and diverse set of activities and lead them to make 
appropriate decisions. Second, insiders have established social networks including superiors, 
subordinates, peers and others through which they gain information and support needed to 
perform their job. Furthermore, internal successions also promote loyalty. Besides that, 
employees will feel more committed when upward mobility to the top rank is afforded 
(Lauterbach, Vu & Weisberg, 1999).  Thus, insiders provide smooth transition and stability 
since they are well acquainted and have participated in developing the existing corporate 




In contrast, researchers (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Lauterbach & Vanisky, 1999) agree that 
an insider selection is only suitable for well-performing firms and they also suggest that 
troubled firms often need to hire outside CEOs as they are more likely to be able to change 
existing strategies and evaluate current problem. According to Khurana (1998), the outside 
candidate was appointed only after a comprehensive search and after the candidate proved 
that he or she is superior to other internal or external candidates for the post.  Furthermore, in 
poor performing firms, outsiders are more preferable than insiders as board believes that the 
outsiders are likely to take decisive action to turn around a bad situation. However, Chung, 
Lubatkin, Roges and Owers (1987) provide evidence that the selection of insiders or outsiders 
by low performing firms does not have a significant influence on the stock market. This is in 
contrast with the belief that an outsider will turn around the poor performing operation or the 
outsider is not viewed as person with the right capability by the market. Apparently, investors 
do not actually believe that a change in leadership will alter the declining profitability of a 
low performing firm.  
 
Unlike outsiders, insiders are likely to be slow in recognizing the urgency of the current 
problem and may pursue the old strategies that are no longer effective (Chung et al., 1987). 
Lauterbach and Vanisky (1999) in their study found that inside selection deteriorates post-
succession performance. Based on the average excess return as the performance indicator, 
they find a statistically different between pre-succession and post-succession performance. 
For internal succession the post-succession performance decrease by 41% as the pre-
succession excess return 13%  while post-succession excess return is -28%.  In contrast, for 
the outside selection, the post-succession performance increase by 35% in which pre- 
succession performance is -39% and post- succession performance is -4%, respectively. Their 
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result indicates that external successions stop firm deterioration, rehabilitate it and help it 
embark on a normal course. 
 
Previous studies also showed that the agency costs are significantly higher when professionals 
manage the firms (Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000). But, the outsiders may have particular knowledge 
of the firm that may be proved to be valuable in mentoring of future-generation leaders, or 
filling in the leadership role (Lee, Lim & Lim, 2003). In larger firms, outsiders have been 
found to play a critical role in strategic decision-making in family firms (Chua, Chrisman & 
Sharma, 2003). Studies by Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) in Israel and Chittoor and Das 
(2007) in India found that management succession to an outsider has a positive impact on the 
performance. Based on the above literatures, there were mixed arguments relating to selection 
of CEO from inside or outside the company. Hence, this study hypothesizes that: 
H9a: There is a positive relationship between inside CEO and performance, for 
GLCs. 
H9b: There is a positive relationship between inside CEO and performance, for 
NGLCs. 
H9c: There is a positive relationship between inside Chairman and performance, for 
GLCs. 









Multiple Directorships  
Board members multiple directorships refer to directors that hold more than one directorship
2
. 
Such directors are considered professional directors because their expertise is needed by more 
than one company. In Malaysia, the MCCG does not prescribe the maximum number of 
directorships per person. However, according to Bursa Malaysia Regulation 2002, Para 15(6), 
a director may not hold more than 25 directorships, specifically not more than ten 
directorships of public listed companies and not more than 15 directorships of non-public 
listed companies. Directors of high-performing firms are more likely to be invited to become 
outside directors of other corporations because they are perceived to have the important skills 
necessary to guide and evaluate managerial behaviour of those corporations. However, Ferris, 
Jaganathan and Pritchard (2003), as cited by Fairchild and Li (2005), claim that multiple 
directorship is not a norm among corporate directors. In their examination of more than 
23,000 directors in 3,190 firms in the US, they find that only 16% of the directors have more 
than one directorship. 
 
A board with its members having multiple directorships is expected to be a high quality board 
and due to their expertise, directors in poor performing firms may take some aggressive 
actions to overcome their poor firms’ performance (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). In order to 
overcome performance problem, they may restructure their organizations and implement other 
drastic actions that can enhance firm performance. Therefore, we hypothesized that: 
H10a: There is a positive relationship between CEO directorship and performance, 
for GLCs. 
H10b: There is a positive relationship between CEO directorship and performance, 
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 Haniffa and Cooke (2005) claims that the aspect of multiple directorships is often discussed in the literature 





H10c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman directorship and 
performance, for GLCs. 
H10d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman directorship and 




























This study utilised secondary data over the period of 2005 to 2009 (5 years). A list of GLCs 
was obtained from the website http://www.pcg.gov.my. Then, a matched-pair method was 
applied whereby 54 GLCs were matched with 54 NGLCs, based on the firm size (total assets) 
and type of industry. The total sample size for 5 years was 540 companies listed on Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia.  
 
DATA GATHERING 
For the GLCs list, it was obtained from the website (http://www.pcg.gov.my). The latest list 
of year 2009 was used in this study. For NGLCs, the companies were identified as other than 
those companies selected as GLCs. All the data were hand-collected. The financial data were 
gathered from the Thomson Financial Datastream Advance. A cross-checking with the annual 
reports had been carried out to make sure the reliability of the data.  
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND MEASUREMENT 
The research model is discussed as below: 
Model 1 (All companies): 






Model 2 (CEO and Chairman of GLC& NGLC): 
PERFit = b0 + b1EDUCit + b2PROFit + b3AGEit + b4GENDER + b5POLGS + b6INSIDE + 
b7MULTIDIR + b8DEBTit + b9FAGEit + b10FSIZEit+ b11IND + eit 
Where:  
PERF = Tobin’s Q, ROA (test one at a time) 
BSIZE 
BINED 
= Board size 
= Board independence 
POSITION = CEO or Chairman 
EDUC = Education level 
PROF = Professional qualification 
AGE = CEO/Chairman age 





= Politician or government servant 
= Inside or outside CEO/Chairman 
= Number of holding directorships 
= Debt 
FAGE = Firm age 
FSIZE 
IND 
= Firm size 
= Industries 
eit  = Idiosyncratic error 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The dependent variable Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of common equity plus book 
value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets (Yeh, Lee & Woidtke, 
2001; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Chu & Cheah, 2004; Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis & Wong, 
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2005; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Martinez, Stohr & Quiroga, 2007; Ibrahim, 
Abdul Samad & Amir, 2008). ROA is the ratio of accounting earnings before interest and 
taxes to the book value of assets. The use of ROA as a performance measure is more 
preferable than other accounting measures such as ROE and EPS because the operating 
income used to calculate ROA is not influenced by special charges and also less susceptible to 
manipulation by managers (Bushman & Smith, 2001) 
 
For CEO/Chairman attributes, inside/outside CEO, education level, professional qualification, 
age, and gender were measured using dummy (0,1) variables. The control variables were debt, 
firm age and firm size. Debt was defined as the book value of long-term debt divided by total 
assets. Firm age was defined as the number of years since incorporation. Firm size was 


















RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Profile of Companies 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. There are 270 GLCs and 270 NGLCs. 
In this research, trading services contributed as the highest industry (44.4%), finance (14.8%), 
industrial products (11.1%), consumer products (11.1%), technology (8.3%), construction 
(7.4%) and infrastructure projects (2.8%).  
 
Table 1 
The Malaysian GLCs and NGLCs 




GLCs 270 50.0 
NGLCs 270 50.0 




Finance 80 14.8 
Industrial products 60 11.1 
Consumer products 60 11.1 
Trading and services 240 44.4 
Infrastructure projects 15 2.8 
Construction 40 7.4 
Technology  45 8.3 
Total 540 100.0 
a














Background of CEO and Chairmen of Malaysian GLCs and NGLCs 
(N = 540) 
    Frequency Percent 
Director Insider 422 78.1 
  Outsider 118 21.8 
Gender Male 531 98.3 
  Female 9 1.7 
Level of education Diploma and below 127 23.5 
  Degree and above 413 76.5 
Professional qualification No  411 76.1 
  Yes  129 23.9 
Age <50yrs 105 19.4 
  >50yrs 430 79.6 
Status Government servant 100 18.5 
  Politician 214 39.6 
  None 226 41.9 
Ethnicity Malay 383 70.9 
  Chinese 98 18.1 
  Foreign 24 4.4 
  Others 35 6.5 
 
Based on Table 2 above, this study found that the majority (78.1%)  of the CEOs and 
Chairmen are internally appointed as opposed to findings documented much earlier in the US 
e.g. Chung, Rogers, Lubatkin and Owers (1987) and only 21.8% are from outside; and most 
of them are male directors, contributed to 98.3%. Thus, it could be argued that despite having 
externally appointed CEOs would provide some kick-starts to innovation, the benefit of 
having internally appointed CEOs that could command respects and loyalties from the 
internally established social networks far outweigh the former (Kotter, 1982). More than 50% 
of the CEO and Chairman of GLCs and NGLCs have a degree qualification and above. It 
shows that 76.5% are CEOs and Chair\man with a degree background, but only 23.9% of 
these groups obtained professional qualifications. In terms of age, around 80% of the sample 
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is the matured CEOs and Chairmen of more than 50 years. Some of them are ex-politicians 
(39.6%), ex-government servants (18.5%) and the rest 42% are not related to any of these two 
sectors. In terms of ethnicity, majority are from Malay group (70.9%), followed by Chinese 
(18.1%), others (6.5%) and foreigners (4.4%).  
 
Univariate Analysis 
Based on Table 3 below, the mean for Tobin’s Q is 0.21 and the mean for ROA is 0.08. This 
finding suggests that GLCs in Malaysia are undervalued as the Tobin’s Q is lower than 1. 
This phenomenon still persists even after taking into account of 95% spread of two standard 
deviations. This is quite puzzling as it may suggests that the stock market is not a primary 
market for investors as GLCs may have been dominated by few institutional shareholders, 
hence it become less liquid. The average board size is eight to nine directors which is similar 
with earlier study in Malaysia (e.g. Yatim, Clarkson and Kent, 2006), with 40% of the 
directors are independent. The mean age of director is 56 years old and the director is holding 
an average of six directorships in companies. Based on the analysis, more than 50% of the 
directors are degree holders, and only 27% are professionally qualified in their area of 
expertise.  
 
In terms of the relationship between the variables, board size is negatively related with the 
Tobin’s Q (-.173**). It explains that with larger board size, it may deteriorate the firm 
performance or larger Tobin’s Q is correlated with smaller board size. Independent directors 
are highly correlated with board size (.678**), but show a lower correlation with ROA (-
.172**). Education is positively correlated with board size (.207**) and board independence 
(.216**). Further, professional qualification is positively correlated with education (.189**). 
It indicates that with educated and qualified directors on the board, it complements each other 
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as it helps the board success. Ethnic does relate positively with ROA (.328**), but has a 
negative correlation with independent directors (-.177**) and age (-.134**). Inside director is 
positively correlated with independent directors (.118**) and negatively related with age (-
.148**). Multiple directorship shows a positive sign with board size (.548**), board 
independence (.451**), education (.301**) and professional qualification (.170**).This 
implies that elements such as independence, education level and professional qualification 
add credits to the appointment of directors. No pairs of the variables have too high correlation 
with each other to suggest serious collinearity threats (the highest is between percentage of 













(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Dependent variables 
 Q ROA BSIZE INED EDUC PROF AGE GENDER POLGS INSIDE MULTIDIR DEBT FAGE FSIZE 
1 
Tobin’s Q MV common 
equity + BV 
preferred shares 




               
2 




-.021               
  
 Independent variables 
  
                
3 
BSIZE No. of directors 
on the board   
8.77 
(2.14) 
-.173** -.050              
4 
INED  % of 
independent 




-.072 -.172** .678**             
5 
EDUC Degree & above 












.002 -.083 .016 .051 .189**           
7 
AGE Age of director 56.49 
(9.45) 
-.035 .059 .031 -.021 -.011 -.065          
8 

















-.053 .095* .094* .118** .037 .006 -.148** .018 -.121*       
11 









 Control variables 
  
                
12 
DEBT BV of long-




.178** -.058 .147** .148** .184** -.002 .060 .055 .015 -.030 .333**     
13 





-.050 .117* .004 .183** .097* .007 -.025 -.054 .129* -.059 .092 .089    
14 
FSIZE Natural log of 
BV/total assets  
12547286.27 
(1.810E+07) 
.066 -.119** .290** .205** .216** .075 .063 .030 -.001 -.016 .375** .522** -.049   
15 




.443** -.059 -.268** -.171** -.130** -.119** -.082 .052 .090 -.164** -.184** -.148** -.226** -.274** 





T-test between GLCs and NGLCs with performance 
  
  Mean SD F t 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Tobin’s Q GLC .226 .327 25.092 1.741* .082 
NGLC .188 .157 
ROA GLC .055 .089 32.787 -4.872*** .000 
NGLC .110 .165 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 4 shows that there is differences in performance between GLCs and NGLCs for both 
performance measures. ROA shows significant value at 99% (t=-4.872, p=.000) and Tobin’s 
Q is significant at 90% (t=1.741, p=.082). Thus, t-test supports H1, which implies there is a 
difference between GLCs and NGLCs performance. In addition, despite NGLCs perform 
better than GLCs as per accounting rule (ROA), they failed to attract better market sentiments 
(Tobin’s Q). This explains better compared to a simpler descriptive analysis as in Table 3 that 
use overall statistics. Thus, this result supports past works (Caves & Christensen, 1980; Kay 
& Thompson, 1986; Wortzel & Wortzel, 1989; Martin & Parker, 1995; Kole & Mulherin, 
1997; Ramirez & Tan, 2004; Ang & Ding, 2006) that companies with government 






Regression Model of Board Mechanisms and Performance  
 
PERFit = b0 + b1BSIZEit + b2BINEDit + b3POSITIONit+ b4DEBTit + b5FAGEit + 







































































































































  0.2378 0.0456 .4467 .0019 0.1756 0.1752 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 (two-tailed) 
a




 shows similar finding as in Table 4. Our sets of independent variables explain bigger 
variation in the Tobin’s Q model for the GLC subsample (R
2
 of about 44%) compared to the 
non-GLC (R
2
 of about 17%) subsample which further lend more evidence on the market 
sensitivity of GLC while non-GLC has more explained variation in the ROA model.  Based 
on this study (refer to Table 5), there is no difference between the role of CEO or Chairman 
and firm performance. Based on the analysis (n=540), the position of CEO or Chairman do 
not show any difference for Tobin’s Q and ROA. So, H1a is not supported in this study as this 
study predicted that there is a difference in CEO/Chairman role of GLCs and NGLCs. As 
GLC and non-GLC in this study is paired to size and industry and as GLCs are generally 
among the biggest, it would be reasonable to assume that such big corporations would have 
more experienced management to assist the CEOs and as such would not be detrimental to 
firm performance. In addition, corporate governance mechanism is much more established in 
bigger firms to avoid CEO’s absolute power unlike smaller companies. To sum, CEO duality 
effect on performance in bigger firms may have been counterbalanced by strong management 
team rather than the CEO alone although this could be case specific as argued in Carpenter, 
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Geletkanycz and Sanders (2004) that suggests the combined capacity of the top management 
that influence long term success rather than the CEOs. 
 
With reference to Table 5, for BSIZE, results reveal that board size is not related to 
performance for all companies, GLCs and NGLs. Thus, H2, H2a and H2b are not supported in 
this study. Again, it seems indicative enough that strong management team is paramount in 
big firms rather than board size alone in GLCs and its paired non-GLCs, however such 
variable could not be publicly observed and as such would be a limitation for this study. This 
would also serve as a future interest to include a relevant proxy as evidence of strong 
management team on firm performance is thin. Board independence (BINED) shows a 
negative sign with ROA (-0.097**). This pattern also consistent when the sample was split 
between GLCs and NGLCs. BINED shown a significant negative sign with ROA (-0.224***) 
for NGLCs. However, the market seems to appreciate independent directors. In the Tobin’s Q 
model, BINED is positive but only for NGLC subsample. We offer the following explanation. 
Board appointments in GLCs are mostly determined by the five GLICs stated in the GLCT 
progress review (see www.pcg.gov.my) or high committee of the government and as such 
may have passed independent tests of the MCCG but may not pass stricter tests e.g. old boys 
network, compared to NGLCs.  This is not entirely surprising as similar finding is 
documented in Higgins (2002) in some companies in Ireland on the appointement of non-
executive directors through old-boys network. So, H3 and H3b are supported based on the 
results found. This implies that number of independent directors on board affects firm 
performance.The higher number of independent directors do not actually enhance 






Regression Model of CEO Attributes and Performance  
 
PERFit = b0 + b1EDUCit + b2PROFit + b3AGEit + b4GENDER + b5POLGS + b6INSIDE 
+ b7MULTIDIR + b8DEBTit + b9FAGEit + b10FSIZEit+ b11IND + eit 
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R2  .2823 .3467 .7387 .5650 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 (two-tailed), # significant at one-tailed test. 
a p<.1 (1-tailed) 
 
For the CEO attributes in GLCs (Table 6), professional qualification, age and inside 
appointment are significant but in the opposite direction. This study find that professional 
qualification (H5a) does not promise better firm performance (-.118***). It is also evident that 
older CEO of GLCs (H6a) do not actually influence the firm performance positively (-
.011***,.003**). Studies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Renneboog, 2000) claim that outside 
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directors can help improve firm performance, but this study found inside/outside CEO for 
GLCs show a decrease (-.092*) in firm performance under H9a. For CEO of NGLCs, 
professional qualification (H5b) shows a significant relationship with performance, but on the 
opposite direction (-.148*). Professional qualification does not help to improve firm 
performance. Thus, this finding support the study done by Guner et al. (2008) that it is 
difficult to assess such influence and the performance does not seem to improve when the 
experts join the board. It is quite plausible that professional qualification by the CEOs is not 
matched with the nature or demand of certain industry. For example, a GLC such as Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad (TNB) may require more professional electrical engineers with business 
savvy mind on the board and especially as the CEO. Some variables are drop forom the model 
due to collinearity problems such as education, gender, politician/government servant and 
multiple directorship.  
 
Table 7 
Regression Model of Chairman Attributes and Performance  
 
PERFit = b0 + b1EDUCit + b2PROFit + b3AGEit + b4GENDER + b5POLGS + b6INSIDE 
+ b7MULTIDIR + b8DEBTit + b9FAGEit + b10FSIZEit+ b11IND + eit 
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R2  .5543 .0530 .1828 .6252 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 (two-tailed) 
 
For regression model of Chairman, Table 7 illustrates that Chairman of GLCs education, 
professional qualification, age, inside and multidirectorships are not significant with 
performance. This suggests that unlike the CEO attributes, professional qualification of the 
chairman among others has less influence on firm performance accross the board. Chairman 
of GLCs with political background or government servant (H8c) is negatively related with 
performance (-.047*).It indicates that having politically connected CEO/Chairman with low 
degrees of profesionalism affect firms performing more poorly (Fan et al, 2007; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994). Overall, results from both regression models suggest that the appointment of 
CEOs for GLCs are paramount and more sensitive towards firm performance compared to 













In this paper we examine the top management characteristics of GLCs and in comparison with 
NGLCs and whether GLCs have higher firm value or vice versa. There are arguments that 
claim that companies with government intervention are better governed; and other school of 
thought claims that private companies or NGLCs are more competitive and have more 
incentive to innovate. Using a sample of Malaysian public listed firms during the period 
2005-2009, we find that there is differences in performance between GLCs and NGLCs. 
Interestingly, board independence does not helps enhancing performance, but just fulfilling 
the requirement on The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. In terms of the 
CEO/Chairman characteristics, there is a relationship between professional qualification, and 
CEO/Chairman as politician/government servant with firm performance. 
 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was revised in 2012 with the aims to strengthen the 
board of directors and audit committees, and to ensure that the board of directors and audit 
committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively. However, actions needed to 
be taken by the regulators to ensure that Malaysian companies do actually practice the good 
corporate governance, and not only on paper as required by The Code.  
 
Further research on qualitative aspects is needed to dig and reveal what is actually behind the 
numbers in the annual reports. Interviews may help to discover what and who are the leaders 
that actually help to enhance firm value. This study is limited in terms of data richness 
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Summary of Hypotheses in The Study 
Hypotheses Findings 
H1: There is a difference between GLCs and NGLCs performance. Significant  
H1a: There is a difference in CEO/Chairman role of GLCs and 
NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H2: There is a relationship between board size and performance. Not significant 
H2a: There is a relationship between board size and performance, 
for GLCs.  
Not significant 
H2b: There is a relationship between board size and performance, 
for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H3: There is a relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and performance. 
Significant 
H3a: There is a relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and performance, for GLCs.  
Not significant 
H3b: There is a relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and performance, for NGLCs.  
Significant 
H4a: There is a positive relationship between CEO  educational 
background and performance, for GLCs. 
Variable drop 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between CEO educational 
background and performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H4c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman 
educational background and performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H4d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman 
educational background and performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between CEO professional 
qualification and performance, for GLCs. 
Significant, -ve 
H5b: There is a positive relationship between CEO professional 
qualification and performance, for NGLCs. 
Significant, -ve 
H5c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman 
professional qualification and performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H5d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman Not significant 
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professional qualification and performance, for NGLCs. 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between CEO age and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Significant, -ve, +ve 
H6b: There is a positive relationship between CEO age and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H6c: There is a positive relationship between Chairman age and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H6d: There is a positive relationship between Chairman age and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H7a: There is a positive relationship between male CEO and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H7b: There is a positive relationship between male CEO and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Variable drop 
H7c: There is a positive relationship between male Chairman and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Variable drop 
H7d: There is a positive relationship between male Chairman and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Variable drop 
H8a: There is a relationship between politician/government 
servant CEO and performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H8b: There is a relationship between politician/government 
servant CEO and performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H8c: There is a relationship between politician/government 
servant Chairman and performance, for GLCs. 
Significant, -ve 
H8d: There is a relationship between politician/government 
servant Chairman and performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H9a: There is a relationship between inside/outside CEO and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Significant, -ve 
H9b: There is a relationship between inside/outside CEO and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
H9c: There is a relationship between inside/outside Chairman and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H9d: There is a relationship between inside/outside Chairman and 




H10a: There is a relationship between CEO directorship and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Variable drop 
H10b: There is a relationship between CEO directorship and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Variable drop 
H10c: There is a relationship between Chairman directorship and 
performance, for GLCs. 
Not significant 
H10d: There is a relationship between Chairman directorship and 
performance, for NGLCs. 
Not significant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
